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INTRODUCTION
Laws protecting wildlife challenge the notion of unrestricted
dominion over private property, in some cases substantially restricting
* The author is an associate at Baker Botts, LLP in Houston, Texas. For their comments and
insights, I wish to thank Laura Underkuffler, James Salzman, John Hart, Jonathan
Wiener and Brigham Daniels, although they are not responsible for any of the conclusions
drawn in this article. I also thank the talented editors of the Columbia Journal of Environmental
Law. I dedicate this article to Eliza.
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the extent to which a landowner can modify her property and thus
alter the natural landscape. The prescriptive nature of these laws, and
the broad, often indeterminate, dynamic landscape to which they
apply, heighten the opportunity for conflict with landowners’
expectations about the absolute and permanent nature of their
1
rights.
2

As demonstrated in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
government attempts to protect the environment are often
thwarted by Fifth Amendment takings claims demanding that “just
compensation” be paid to the property owner. In Lucas, an
environmental regulation that protected upland coastal resources,
such as habitat for endangered and threatened species, prohibited
3
The
a landowner from developing his beachfront property.
landowner challenged the statute, claiming that it was a Fifth
4
Amendment taking of his property without just compensation.
The United States Supreme Court held that because the regulation
5
wiped out all economic value of the property, it was a taking. The
Court, however, also established an exception to the rule, holding
that the state could overcome the claim if it could prove on remand
to the South Carolina Supreme Court that “background principles”
of the state’s law of property already placed restrictions on the
6
landowner’s title.
Such “background principles,” the Court
continued, must “do no more than duplicate the result that could
have been achieved in the courts by adjacent landowners (or other
uniquely affected persons) under the state’s law of private
nuisance, or by the state under its complementary power to abate
7
nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.”
The Court advanced the Lucas decision as a clarification of
federal takings law.
However, the Court’s reference to
“background principles” of state property law as the only potential
exception to “preservation takings” raises important issues as to the
meaning and scope of this exception. The Court’s equation of
1. Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Protect Where the Wild
Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-O-Links, and Other Things That Go Bump in the Night, 85 IOWA L.
REV. 849, 858–59 (2000).
2. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
3. Id. at 1006–07.
4. Id. at 1003.
5. Id. at 1019.
6. Id. at 1029.
7. Id.
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“background principles” with common-law nuisance includes a pair
of deeply rooted property law principles that limit property owners’
rights under certain circumstances: the public trust doctrine and
the wildlife trust doctrine. Legal scholarship since Lucas has
highlighted this aspect of the case, focusing primarily on the
Supreme Court’s introduction of the “background principles”
inquiry. One scholar noted:
The Court’s reliance on common law principles to craft an exception
to its per se compensation rule misapprehended the continued
robustness of old maxims, such as those restricting the uses to which
private property can be put when they threaten wildlife, and thus
8
potentially created an exception much wider than intended.

Another scholar, noting how Lucas has opened the door for
application of the public and wildlife trust doctrines, explained that
with traditional takings analysis
courts investigate first, whether there has been a permanent physical
taking . . . and second, whether there has been a regulatory taking
that has resulted in no economically viable remaining use of the
property. . . . [T]raditional takings analysis . . . has come under
considerable attack.
Most seriously, the analysis ignores the
exception laid out in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council for
background principles of property law, such as the public trust
doctrine, that have the potential to provide a much firmer defense of
9
wildlife.

No scholar has discussed, however, the oral arguments presented
during the Lucas remand before the South Carolina Supreme
Court. These arguments offer definitive proof of the accuracy of
prior observations regarding the public and wildlife trust doctrines
and also provide a glimpse into how these doctrines may shape
modern takings law as state and federal courts apply evolving
8. Babcock, supra note 1, at 855. The use of such “robust maxims” may be particularly
important as almost ninety percent of the nearly 1000 plant and animal species protected
under the ESA are found on private land. Id. at 857–58. As such, private property creates a
large web of wildlife habitat, without which these species would likely become extinct.
Despite these facts, federal and state environmental laws are increasingly coming under
attack by private property owners who often see these limitations on property rights as, at the
most, unconstitutional, and at the least, always compensable.
9. Anna R.C. Caspersen, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Impossibility of
“Takings” by Wildlife, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 357, 384 (1996).
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public and wildlife trust principles. Original research reveals that
during the oral arguments, the court actually invited the state to
assert the public trust doctrine as a background principle of
common law pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s
10
directive. Inexplicably, the state of South Carolina failed to make
a public trust argument during the remand. Nonetheless, this
invitation by the court lends new support to the argument that
these doctrines may be asserted to protect environmental
regulations from takings claims under the circumstances presented
in Lucas.
Environmental regulations clearly merit protection given modern
legislative attempts to enact compensation requirements for
regulation affecting property rights, such as proposed federal
legislation which would have required compensation for “any
11
diminution” in the value of private property. Several states have
12
recently passed similarly sweeping laws. This type of legislation
directly targets public preservation efforts, including the South
13
Carolina statute at issue in Lucas and the federal Endangered
14
Species Act, among others. In view of such “takings legislation,” it
is important to analyze historical judicial precedent regarding
10. See infra notes 149–159 and accompanying text. No author has before, to my
knowledge, discussed the actual oral arguments presented on remand to the South Carolina
Supreme Court. These arguments were neither transcribed in court documents, nor
detailed in the final court order. When I contacted the court to request a copy of the
recording, the court staff informed me that I was the first person to make such a request.
st
11. See Just Compensation Act, H.R. 1388, 103d Cong. (1 Sess. 1993). Two other
“takings” bills were introduced during the same Congressional term, as the Private Property
Owners Bill of Rights was introduced in both houses of Congress in 1993. BONNIE B.
BURGESS, FATE OF THE WILD: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND THE FUTURE OF
BIODIVERSITY 79–80 (2001).
12. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(3)(b) (West 2007) (requiring compensation if new
government regulation negatively impacts “an existing fair market value” of property). See
also Ballot Measure 37, OR. REV. STAT. § 197.305(1)–(3)(d) (2005) (renumbered from OR.
REV. STAT. § 197.352 in 2007 by the Oregon Legislative Counsel). Measure 37 either
“requires state and local governments to compensate private property owners for the
reduction in the fair market value of their real property that results from any land use
regulations of those governmental entities that restrict the use of the subject properties,” or
“allows state and local governments to ‘modify, remove or not apply the land use regulation’”
at all. MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308, 312 (Or. 2006) (emphasis
added). The Oregon Supreme Court upheld Measure 37, which was passed by referendum
by the people of Oregon. See id. Louisiana and Mississippi have also enacted similar
legislation. See George Charles Homsy, The Land Use Planning Impacts of Moving “Partial
Takings” from Political Theory to Legal Reality, 37 URB. LAW. 269, 278–79, 281 (2005).
13. See infra notes 136–139 and accompanying text.
14. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000).
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environmental regulation of private land.
There now exists a new lens through which to analyze historical
and modern jurisprudence which sheds additional light on the
takings analysis—the lens of the Lucas remand. Historical land use
restrictions, such as the public and wildlife trust doctrines, provide
a means to protect environmental interests with a tool more
powerful than traditional takings analysis. As indicated by the
court in the Lucas remand, the public and wildlife trust doctrines
may be used to obviate certain court-ordered or statutory
compensation requirements in order to allow the regulation of
natural resources that the government deems to be of the utmost
public interest. Furthermore, use of these doctrines may be
necessary if the federal and state governments are to adequately
protect important natural resources via environmental regulation.
As one scholar noted, “government could not function if it had to
pay all those inconvenienced by regulatory actions for the benefit
15
of the public at large.”
This article seeks to address more thoroughly how the historical
“old maxims” of the public and wildlife trust doctrines can be used
as Lucas background principles of property law to overcome takings
challenges brought against state and federal environmental
regulations. First, I will describe the historical underpinnings of
the public trust doctrine and the wildlife trust doctrine prior to the
founding of the nation. I will then summarize Illinois Central
16
17
Railroad v. Illinois and Geer v. Connecticut, which are the key
Supreme Court cases establishing the validity of these doctrines in
the United States. I will also discuss how the public trust doctrine,
as presented in Illinois Central, and the wildlife trust doctrine, as
presented in Geer, are driven by the same logic and the same
historical background.
I assert that the doctrines may be
interchangeably applied as a means of protecting important
environmental resources. Also, I will show how these doctrines
have expanded beyond the subject matter presented in the seminal
cases and have evolved into tools useful for shielding regulations
addressing a wide range of environmental resources from takings
claims.
15. Caspersen, supra note 9, at 389 (summarizing the position of former Secretary of the
Interior Bruce Babbitt).
16. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
17. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
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Second, I will illustrate how the use of these doctrines might have
changed the ultimate outcome of the Lucas case. During the Lucas
remand, the state of South Carolina missed an important
opportunity to ensure that the public and wildlife trust doctrines
were firmly established as precedents for overcoming takings claims
brought against regulations protecting important coastal resources.
Furthermore, the state deprived the court of an opportunity to
demonstrate that specific application of public and wildlife trust
background principles may evolve over time as part of a state’s
body of common law. The court’s willingness to allow such
evolution is evidenced by the fact that it invited the state to assert
the public trust doctrine, even though South Carolina courts had
never before considered public trust protection for the specific
18
In addition, and perhaps more
resources at issue in Lucas.
fundamentally, I will argue that federal courts can, under their own
analysis, uphold application of the public and wildlife trust
19
Illinois
doctrines under the circumstances presented in Lucas.
Central and Geer indicate that these doctrines, much like the police
power, are background principles of property law that inhere in
every state at the time of each state’s creation. In other words, the
public and wildlife trust doctrines inhere in the property rights
systems of each state equally and independently, regardless of
whether the courts of individual states have previously incorporated
these doctrines into their jurisprudence regarding specific natural
resources. Thus, even if public and wildlife trust protection of
certain resources is not present within a state’s preexisting body of
common law, state and federal courts may permit controlled
evolution of public and wildlife trust principles within states
applying the doctrines in order to shield preservation regulations
from federal takings claims.

18. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
19. This point counters potential arguments that the Supreme Court could not have
done so because federal courts will not create state common law, nor will they apply the
common law of one state to another if the latter state’s courts had not previously
incorporated the common law principle in question into its jurisprudence. See Murdoch v.
City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
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II. THE PUBLIC AND WILDLIFE TRUST DOCTRINES: HISTORY AND
INTERPRETATION
A. Pre-American Roots
A review of the historical underpinnings of the public and
wildlife trust doctrines demonstrates that private property rights, as
understood at the founding of America, have long yielded to
important public environmental interests. These doctrines are
deeply rooted in American notions of property ownership and land
use, stemming from ancient Rome and subsequently passing from
England to the American Colonies and ultimately to the various
states.
In ancient times, Roman law divided property into either public
20
or common property. Public property included
res nullius, res communes, res publicae, res universatitis, and res divini juris;
respectively, things that are unowned and open to all by their nature,
things that are publicly owned and made open to the public by law,
things owned by a public group in its corporate capacity, and things
21
‘unownable’ because of their divine or sacred status.

The Roman government viewed wildlife as a res nullius public
22
property interest—the property of no one. Wildlife being animals
ferae naturae (“of a wild nature”) were reducible to ownership by
23
any person who could capture them.
The rule of capture was
distinguished from the rules governing common property, or res
24
communis, such as the oceans and navigable bodies of water. The
Romans’ believed that such property “remained held in
common . . . so that no individual could appropriate any portion of
25
it by any unilateral act whatsoever.” Roman protection of common
property, therefore, may be characterized as the first
implementation of public trust principles by a governmental
authority.
20. Geer, 161 U.S. at 522.
21. James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, 66 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6
(2003).
22. Richard A. Epstein, The Modern Uses of Ancient Law, 48 S.C. L. REV. 243, 245 (1997).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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However, the Romans viewed wildlife as a public property interest,
rather than common, because:
There are things which we acquire the dominion of, as by the law of
nature, which the light of natural reason causes every man to see, and
others we acquire by the civil law; that is to say, by methods which
belong to the government . . . . [T]he law of nature is more ancient,
because it took birth with the human race . . . . Thus, all the animals
which can be taken upon the earth, in the sea, or in the air, that is to
say, wild animals, belong to those who take them, because that which
belongs to nobody is acquired by the natural law by the person who
first possesses it. 26

Based on this view, the United States Supreme Court has
reasoned that Roman conceptions of natural law placed little
restriction on the power of an individual to take and control
27
The right of individuals to control wildlife in Roman
wildlife.
times was distinct from the government’s authority to protect
“common property” resources under its lawmaking power.
A shift occurred, however, in feudal Europe, when countries first
began to assert that the right to control wildlife should be “subject
to the governmental authority under its power, not only as a matter
28
This shift was
of regulation, but also of absolute control.”
recognized by the eighteenth century French treatise writer
Pothier, who noted that “[i]n France, as well as in all other civilized
countries of Europe, the civil law has restrained the liberty which
the pure law of nature gave to every one to capture animals who . . .
29
belong to no person in particular.” Pothier further noted that
“the sovereigns have reserved to themselves, and to those to whom
26. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523 (1896) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
27. Id. The Court in the Geer opinion provided a thorough historical discussion of the
relationship between governments and citizens in the area of wildlife regulation. However, it
appears that the Court presented an inaccurate history regarding the characterization of
wildlife as common or public during Roman times. The Court asserted that wildlife was
common property, rather than public, because wildlife, “having no owner, were considered
as belonging in common to all the citizens of the state.” Id. at 522. This is contradictory to
the modern interpretation, as presented by Epstein, supra note 22, which characterizes
wildlife in Roman times as public property, rather than common. Thus, the history
recounted in this article tracks the modern interpretation of ancient history, and attempts to
consolidate the modern view with the overarching premise regarding wildlife put forth by
the Court in Geer.
28. Geer, 161 U.S. at 523.
29. Id. at 524 (quoting Robert Joseph Pothier, Traité du Droit de Proprieté, Nos. 27–28.).
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they judge proper to transmit it, the right to hunt all game, and
30
have forbidden hunting to other persons.”
Pothier explained that “ancient” authors, such as those during
Roman times, opposed this viewpoint, and had claimed that “as
God has given to man dominion over the beasts, the prince had no
authority to deprive all his subjects of a right which God had given
31
them.” These ancient authors argued that natural law permitted
hunting to each individual, and that any civil law which forbade it
was “contrary to the natural law, and exceed[ed], consequently, the
power of the legislator, who, being himself submitted to the natural
32
law, can ordain nothing contrary to that law.” Pothier responded
to these arguments, stating that:
It is easy to reply to these objections . . . From the fact that God has
given to human kind dominion over wild beasts it does not follow
that each individual of the human race should be permitted to
exercise this dominion. The civil law, it is said, cannot be contrary to
the natural law. This is true as regards those things which the natural
law commands or which it forbids; but the civil law can restrict that which
the natural law only permits. The greater part of all civil laws are
nothing but restrictions on those things which the natural law would
33
otherwise permit.

Thus, natural law was no longer seen as absolute in the wildlife
context, but instead permissive: the sovereign could restrict that
which natural law merely allowed.
Under this reasoning,
governments could legitimately implement regulations for the
protection of wildlife, because an overall community benefit,
bestowed by a system of civil law, trumped the permissive natural
law interests of individual private parties.
Even Blackstone, who wrote that property was the absolute right of
34
every Englishman, distinguished between property which was
private and property which was of common interest to all.
Blackstone pointed out that the right of an individual to possess
property depended on the nature of the property and whether or
not it was held in “common.” Blackstone stated that “after all,
30. Id. (quoting Robert Joseph Pothier, Traité du Droit de Proprieté, Nos. 27–28.).
31. Id. (quoting Robert Joseph Pothier, Traité du Droit de Proprieté, Nos. 27–28.).
32. Id. (quoting Robert Joseph Pothier, Traité du Droit de Proprieté, Nos. 27–28.).
33. Id. (quoting Robert Joseph Pothier, Traité du Droit de Proprieté, Nos. 27–28.)
(emphasis added).
34. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *134.
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there are some few things which, notwithstanding the general
introduction and continuance of property, must still unavoidably
35
With specific reference to wildlife,
remain in common . . . .”
Blackstone noted that
it cannot be denied, that, by the law of nature, every man, from the
prince to the peasant, has an equal right of pursuing, and taking to
his own use, all such creatures as are ferae naturae, and therefore the
property of nobody, but liable to be seized by the first occupant. And
so it was held by the imperial law, even so late as Justinian’s time. . . .
But it follows from the very end and constitution of society, that this natural
right, as well as many others belonging to man as an individual, may be
restrained by positive laws enacted for reasons of state or for the supposed
36
benefit of the community.

In modern times, Blackstone’s assertion that the taking of wildlife
may be restricted by positive law became a commonly held view
regarding wildlife regulation, as well as other types of
environmental regulation, in England. Furthermore, these basic
37
In
principles passed from England to the American colonies.
1694, the Massachusetts Bay Colony enforced the first closed
hunting season in North America, which applied to all deer within
38
the colony. In 1708, various New York counties also established
39
closed seasons to protect the populations of various game species.
Regulation of wildlife thus “vested in the colonial governments,
where [it was] not denied by their charters, or in conflict with
40
grants of the royal prerogative.” Today, states maintain the same
“prerogative,” since “the power which the colonies thus possessed
passed to the states . . . and remains in them at the present day, in
so far as its exercise may be not incompatible with, or restrained by,
the rights conveyed to the federal government by the
41
Every state in the Union has since ratified the
constitution.”
35. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *14. See also Geer, 161 U.S. at 526.
36. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *410 (emphasis added). See also Geer, 161
U.S. at 527.
37. In fact, early England passed laws which established preserves, similar to U.S. wildlife
refuges, which were intended to protect the land from grazing by domesticated animals.
Babcock, supra note 1, at 882.
38. Shannon Petersen, Bison to Blue Whales: Protecting Endangered Species Before the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 22-SPG ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 71, 73 (1999).
39. Id.
40. Geer, 161 U.S. at 527.
41. Id. at 528.
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common law principles espoused by Blackstone by legislating for
42
the protection of important environmental resources.
Thus, early state efforts to incorporate wildlife and
environmental regulations into their respective bodies of law
exhibit that early state governments did not set out to aggressively
guard private property rights at the expense of protecting
43
important public resources. Furthermore, as Hope Babcock has
noted, “The view of property that crossed the ocean and found root
in the colonies, therefore, was not absolute, certain, or exclusive,
but was encumbered by communal and political obligations well
44
This governmental
into the eighteenth century and beyond.”
prerogative, which later took the form of the public and wildlife
trust doctrines, trumped private property interests, to a degree, and
became one of the first forms of environmental regulation widely
accepted as constituting such “communal obligations.”
B. The Public and Wildlife Trust Doctrines in the United States—
Introduction to Illinois Central and Geer
In order to understand the legal significance of the public and
wildlife trust doctrines, it is first necessary to analyze the holdings
in the seminal cases establishing those doctrines and the
theoretical underpinnings of each doctrine within American
jurisprudence. These cases demonstrate that the United States
Supreme Court long ago validated the use of the public and
wildlife trust doctrines as a means of protecting important public
resources and overcoming takings claims.
1.

Illinois Central

In 1869, the Illinois legislature granted title of lands submerged
under Lake Michigan to the Illinois Central Railroad (the
45
Railroad). Approximately fourteen years later, the state sought to
undo this grant by bringing a claim against the Railroad asserting
that the Railroad had “encroached . . . upon the domain of the
state, and its original ownership and control of the waters of the

42. EPA, State Environmental Agencies, http://www.epa.gov/epahome/state.htm (last
visited Nov. 21, 2008).
43. Babcock, supra note 1, at 876.
44. Id.
45. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 437 (1892).
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46

harbor and of the lands thereunder . . . .” The Railroad, which
had already commenced reclamation of a portion of the land for
the purpose of laying tracks and other development, sought to
retain the property by claim of the previous state grant. The Court,
however, found that the Railroad did not have a legitimate claim to
the property because title to submerged lands
is a title held in trust for the people of the state . . . . The trust
devolving upon the state for the public, and which can only be
discharged by the management and control of property in which the
public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the
property. The control of the state for the purposes of the trust can
47
never be lost . . . .

The Court’s analysis relied largely on its characterization of lands
under navigable waters as “property in which the whole people are
48
interested” and as public property “of a special character.” The
Court also noted at length the value of the Chicago harbor to the
49
people of the state of Illinois. In doing so the Court asserted that
the Railroad’s claim of ownership to the submerged lands, if
allowed to succeed, would “place every harbor in the country at the
mercy of a majority of the legislature of the state in which the
50
harbor is situated.” The Court therefore rejected the Railroad’s
claim, asserting that the lands were “a subject of public concern to
the whole people of the state. The trust with which they are held,
51
The
therefore, is governmental, and cannot be alienated . . . .”
Court continued by explaining that “[t]his follows necessarily from
the public character of the property, being held by the whole
52
people for purposes in which the whole people are interested.”
Thus, the public trust doctrine, though implicitly referenced in
53
earlier cases, was explicitly established by the United States
46. Id. at 438.
47. Id. at 452–53.
48. Id. at 453–54.
49. Id. at 454–55.
50. Id. at 455.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 456.
53. See Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 413 (1842) (finding it unjustifiable “[i]f
the shores, and rivers and bays and arms of the sea, and the land under them, instead of
being held as a public trust for the benefit of the whole community . . . had been converted
by the charter itself into private property, to be parcelled out and sold by the duke, for his
own individual emolument[.]”). One author has noted that the Court in Martin found that
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Supreme Court. The language used by the Court laid the
foundation for numerous subsequent cases involving the public
trust and arguably established the public trust doctrine as a
54
longstanding background principle of property law.
The theory driving the public trust doctrine, as derived from
Illinois Central, is that the public’s rights in trust lands inhered prior
to private property owners’ rights.
Thus, under certain
circumstances when the two conflict, as when the state conveys
public trust lands to private hands or enacts legislation which may
limit property rights, the private property rights must be
55
In other words, the
subordinate to the rights of the public.
government may not inappropriately favor private parties with
public trust resources, nor can private property owners assert
control over resources in which the public has a paramount
56
interest.
2.

Geer

Geer involved a Connecticut statute which regulated the hunting
of game birds. The appellant argued that the state lacked authority
to enact the regulation. Using similar language to that in Illinois
Central, the Supreme Court held that states have the right to
“control and regulate the common property in game,” and such
control “lodged in the state . . . [and] is to be exercised, like all
other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the
people . . . not . . . for the benefit of private individuals as
57
distinguished from the public good.” The Court found that the
state had authority to regulate game because of wildlife’s “peculiar

“the public trust character of navigable waters and their submerged lands survived a grant by
the King of his proprietary interest in them . . . the question was whether it also survived the
American Revolution. [The Court] declared that it did.” MICHAEL BEAN & MELANIE
ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 11 (3d ed. 1997).
54. See, e.g., Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1917); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928); State v. Sour Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 78 (App. Div. 2000); Sierra Club v.
Dep’t of Forestry and Fire Protection, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 (Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (ordered
not published); National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); Lassen
v. Ariz. ex rel. Ariz. Highway Dept., 385 U.S. 458 (1967); Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54 (Alaska
1996).
55. Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General as the
Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 57, 71 (2005).
56. Babcock, supra note 1, at 892–93.
57. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1896).
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nature . . . and its common ownership by the citizens of the State.”
Geer is the foundational case establishing wildlife as an
environmental interest which may be legally protected pursuant to
the public interest.
59
In 1979, Hughes v. Oklahoma overruled Geer, but only on the
60
In
narrow issue of whether a state could actually own wildlife.
Hughes, a defendant claimed that an Oklahoma law prohibiting the
interstate sale of minnows procured within the state was
unconstitutional because it violated the federal government’s
Commerce Clause power. The Hughes Court ruled in favor of the
61
defendant, finding that the statute was indeed unconstitutional.
However, the Court left fully intact the power of the state to act
pursuant to the wildlife trust doctrine, as long as the state did not
hinder interstate commerce in violation of the Constitution. The
Court affirmatively pointed out that “overruling Geer does not leave
the states powerless to protect and conserve wild animal life within
62
their borders,” and “the general rule we adopt in this case makes
ample allowance for preserving . . . the legitimate state concerns for
63
conservation and protection of wild animals.”
Ultimately, the wildlife trust doctrine, as established in Geer,
recognizes that “[w]ildlife management in this country has been a
prerogative of government since colonial times, as it was in
England, and, as in England, laws regarding wildlife have helped
64
Because the wildlife trust doctrine
define property rights.”
inheres in the title to property prior to private interests obtaining
that title, it prevents landowners from using property in a way that
damages wildlife resources in which the public has an interest.
State laws protecting such resources are simply codifications of this
65
common law principle.

58. Id. at 530.
59. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
60. See generally id.; see also Babcock, supra note 1, at 885.
61. See generally Hughes, 441 U.S. 322.
62. Id. at 338.
63. Id. at 335–36. At least one modern court interpreted Hughes to preclude the finding
of a Fifth Amendment taking for wildlife regulations because “the state as trustee has the
power to regulate to protect wildlife for the benefit of the public at large.” Caspersen, supra
note 9, at 383 (citing to Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843 (D. Wyo. 1994)).
64. Babcock, supra note 1, at 883.
65. Id. at 889.
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C. Historical and Legal Parallels of Illinois Central and Geer
The public and wildlife trust doctrines have nearly identical
historical roots, as detailed in Illinois Central and Geer. An historical
analysis of the two cases allows for a virtual merger of the two
doctrines, as the foundation for each doctrine can be traced to the
same source—the English crown.
In Illinois Central, the Court, quoting People v. N.Y. & Staten Island
66
Ferry Co., stated that:
The title to lands under tide waters, within the realm of England,
were by the common law deemed to be vested in the king as a public
trust, to subserve and protect the public right to use them . . . . The
king, by virtue of his proprietary interest, could grant the soil so that
it should become private property, but his grant was subject to the
paramount right of public use of navigable waters, which he could
neither destroy nor abridge. In every such grant there was an implied
reservation of the public right, and so far as it assumed to interfere
with it, or to confer a right to impede or obstruct navigation, or to
make an exclusive appropriation of the use of navigable waters, the
67
grant was void.
68

The Court continued by citing Stockton v. Balt. & N.Y. R.R. Co.,
which described the transmission of the public trust doctrine from
England to the several states. The Court stated that “prior to the
Revolution the shore and lands under water of the navigable
streams and waters of the province of New Jersey belonged to the
king of Great Britain, as part of the jura regalia of the crown, and
69
devolved to the state by right of conquest.” The Court asserted
that after conquest “the said lands were held by the state, as they
were by the king, in trust for the public . . . . [B]eing subject to this
trust, they were publici juris; in other words, they were held for the
70
use of the people at large.”
Similarly, the Court in Geer, which was decided four years after
Illinois Central, traced an almost identical route to the source of the
wildlife trust doctrine—from England to the colonies and finally to
the states. The Court noted that “[t]he practice of the government
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

68 N.Y. 71, 76 (1877).
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1896).
32 F. 9 (C.C.N.J. 1891)
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 457 (quoting Stockton, 32 F. at 19).
Id. (quoting Stockton, 32 F. at 19–20).
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of England from the earliest time to the present has put into
execution the authority to control and regulate the taking of
71
game.” The Court continued by stating:
Undoubtedly, this attribute of government to control the taking of
animals ferae naturae, which was thus recognized and enforced by
the common law of England, was vested in the colonial
governments . . . . It is also certain that the power which the colonies
thus possessed passed to the states with the separation from the
72
mother country, and remains in them at the present day.

The Court further noted that at that point in time most states
had already passed laws for both the protection and the
73
preservation of wildlife.
71. Scholars have stated that “the essential core of English wildlife law on the eve of the
American Revolution was the complete authority of the King and Parliament to determine
what rights others might have with respect to the taking of wildlife.” BEAN, supra note 53, at
10. The Supreme Court has asserted that this same power transitioned to the states in an
unchanged form: “[W]hen the people of New Jersey took possession of the reins of
government, and took into their own hands the powers of sovereignty, the prerogatives and
regalities which before belonged either to the crown or the parliament, became immediately
and rightfully vested in the state.” Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 416 (1842).
72. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 527–28 (1896). Scholars have noted that
the English conceptualization of wildlife as res communes (belonging to no individual,
like the air and oceans) and ferae naturae (animals which by their nature are wild) and
common law doctrines that applied to wildlife took root in this country and endured
largely without change. English laws, which gave the Crown complete authority to
determine the rights of landowners with respect to wildlife management, also became
part of the common law of the colonies and eventually that of the several states which
assumed the Crown’s responsibility to act ‘as trustee to support the title [to wildlife] for
the common use.’
Babcock, supra note 1, at 880–81. An example of the lengths to which the crown in England
could go in order to restrain private property rights is the use of “Forest Jurisdiction”—a
system of forest laws which went so far as to have special courts and officials administer them.
In these jurisdictions, “all forest land ‘was subject to an easement for the benefit of wildlife’
that allowed forest officials to enter private land and remove vegetation needed for wildlife.”
BEAN, supra note 53, at 9. The Forest Jurisdiction began in England when “William the
Conqueror laid waste thirty-six Towns in Hampshire to make a Forest.” Id. This is an
extreme example of land use regulation to say the least.
73. Geer, 161 U.S. at 528. Once again, “protection and preservation” of wildlife might
necessarily entail protection and preservation of wildlife habitat. The Court’s historical
tracing of the wildlife trust doctrine further indicates that “game” is not an exhaustive list of
resources protected by the trust. The Court quoted Blackstone’s assertion that the “natural
right” of man to control game, “as well as many other [natural rights] belonging to man as an
individual, may be restrained by positive laws enacted for reasons of state or for the supposed
benefit of the community.” Id. at 527 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *411)
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Illinois Central and Geer demonstrate that the public and wildlife
trust doctrines not only have the same historical background, but
are largely driven by the same reasoning.
Both doctrines
emphasize holding in “trust” certain natural resources in which the
public has an interest, and each doctrine highlights the need to do
so for the benefit of the people. Both doctrines also predate and
limit private property rights to a degree. Furthermore, at least one
court has interpreted Geer as the application of the public trust
doctrine, rather than as the application of a distinctly designated
“wildlife trust doctrine.” The Supreme Court of Alaska, in Pullen v.
74
Ulmer, used the public trust doctrine to protect salmon as an asset
of public interest because it found that “the state ‘acts as trustee of
75
the natural resources for the benefit of its citizens.’” In doing so,
the court noted that though Hughes overruled Geer on the
ownership issue, “[n]othing in the opinion . . . indicated any
76
In
retreat from the state’s public trust duty discussed in Geer.”
addition, at least one scholar has since noted that “[i]n Geer v.
Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court applied the public
77
trust doctrine to the taking of wildlife.”
The public and wildlife trust doctrines are, therefore,
interchangeable. Illinois Central and Geer, handed down four years
apart, demonstrate that both lake beds under navigable waters and
wildlife are on the same plane of resources in which the public has
a keen interest. Furthermore, cases since Illinois Central and Geer
indicate that courts should not focus on whether the subject of
regulation is a lake bed or a game animal, but instead on whether
the regulation in question addresses an important public resource.
Various courts, as discussed below, have asserted that wildlife,
plants, and the habitats upon which these flora and fauna depend
78
Therefore, if courts find these
are of great public import.
environmental amenities to be covered under the public or wildlife
trust doctrines, regulations protecting those amenities may be
immune to takings claims. If there is no pre-existing right arising
from a landowner’s title to property that allows the landowner to
use, allocate or destroy trust resources, then no taking of private
(emphasis added).
74. 923 P.2d 54 (Alaska 1996).
75. Id. at 60 (quoting Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488, 495 (Alaska 1988)).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Kanner, supra note 55, at 72 (emphasis added).
78. See infra note 102.
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79

D. Broad Application of the Public and Wildlife Trust Doctrines to
Environmental Resources
Some might argue that Illinois Central’s application of the public
trust doctrine should be limited to the specific subject matter that
the case addressed, i.e., submerged lands. In fact, the most recent
Supreme Court decision upholding application of the public trust
doctrine to tidelands demonstrates the Court’s narrow focus on this
80
particular natural resource. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,
the Court considered whether the state of Mississippi could exert
the public trust doctrine to protect forty-two acres of non-navigable
tidelands. The Court noted the existence of a long line of cases
81
upholding “State[ ] dominion over lands beneath tidal waters.”
The Court concluded that “our cases firmly establish that the
States, upon entering the Union, were given ownership over all
82
lands beneath waters subject to the tide’s influence.”
However, because most United States Supreme Court decisions
explicitly invoking the public trust doctrine have dealt with
submerged lands, it does not follow that the Supreme Court
83
intends to so limit the doctrine’s application. The Court’s nonacceptance of public or wildlife trust cases regarding other natural
resources is by no means definitive evidence that the Court would
refuse to apply those doctrines to other resources. On the
contrary, lower courts’ application of these doctrines to numerous
other resources and the lack of Supreme Court grants of certiorari
to those types of cases demonstrate that it is not the Court’s intent
84
to limit the scope of these doctrines to submerged lands. The
application of the public trust doctrine (or wildlife trust doctrine)
to wildlife in Geer lends the strongest evidence in this regard. As
discussed, the two doctrines have the same historical roots, and the
79. Babcock, supra note 1, at 893–94.
80. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
81. Id. at 474.
82. Id. at 484.
83. In fact, in Phillips the Court found that “[s]tates have the authority to define the limits
of lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit.” Id.
at 475. But see Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Ariz. Highway Dep’t, 385 U.S. 458 (1967) (the Court
considered application of the public trust doctrine to public lands clearly owned by the state).
See also Kanner, supra note 55, at 83.
84. See infra note 102.
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Supreme Court used nearly the same language when applying the
doctrines in Illinois Central and Geer. Thus the argument that the
Supreme Court intended the public trust doctrine to apply only to
submerged lands has little merit.
A closer reading of Illinois Central suggests that submerged land is
but one example of a number of resources in which the “public has
an interest,” and which may be protected from takings claims
brought by private property owners. First, the Court asserted that
the state must exercise the trust which “devolve[s] upon [it] for the
public, and which can only be discharged by the management and
85
control of property in which the public has an interest.” Similarly, the
Court stated, “The ownership of the navigable waters of the harbor,
and of the lands under them, is a subject of public concern to the
whole people of the state. The trust with which they are held,
86
The
therefore, is governmental, and cannot be alienated . . . .
Court found that “[t]his follows necessarily from the public
character of the property, being held by the whole people for
87
purposes in which the whole people are interested.”
Property in which the “public has an interest” and which is a
“subject of public concern” is not limited to submerged lands
under navigable waters. The Court’s choice of language supports
such a conclusion. The Court twice uses the word “like” when
referring to lake beds:
The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the
whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under
them . . . than it can abdicate its police powers . . . . So with trusts
connected with public property, or property of a special character,
like lands under navigable waters; they cannot be placed entirely
beyond the direction and control of the state. 88

The Court’s use of the word “like” indicates its intent to set
submerged lands off as merely an example of a resource in which
the public has an interest, and which the state can control by
asserting the public trust doctrine, rather than as an exhaustive list.
In fact, it appears from the second statement above that the
operative language that triggers protection is “property of a special
85.
86.
87.
88.

Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (emphasis added).
Id. at 455 (emphasis added).
Id. at 456 (emphasis added).
Id. at 453–54 (emphasis added).
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character.” This language indicates that courts should focus on a
specific subset of resources for application of the public trust
doctrine (in addition to “public property,” of course).
Furthermore, the Court’s apparent test to determine whether to
apply the public trust doctrine is whether a “property of a special
character” is being held “for purposes in which the whole people
are interested,” rather than the narrow factual determination that
the resource itself is submerged land.
The Illinois Central Court also provided an interesting analogy
that further demonstrates the broad application of the public trust
doctrine to a variety of public interests. The Court discussed the
89
case of Newton v. Mahong County Commissioners, which involved an
1874 act passed by the Ohio legislature that ordered the transfer of
90
a county seat from one town to another. Citizens brought suit,
arguing that the original act of 1846 establishing the county seat in
their town “constituted an executed contract which is binding on
the state,” and the 1874 act unconstitutionally “impair[ed] the
91
obligation of the contract.” The Court disagreed, declaring that
state legislatures must be allowed the freedom to protect important
public interests regardless of what commitments previous
92
The Illinois Central Court reiterated this
legislatures made.
principle, and stated that:
[L]egislative acts concerning public interests are necessarily public
laws . . . ; it is vital to the public welfare that each [legislature] should
be able at all times to do whatever the varying circumstances and
present exigencies attending the subject may require . . . .
. . . [I]f this is true doctrine as to the location of a county seat, it is
apparent that it must apply with greater force to the control of the soils
and beds of navigable waters in the great public harbors held by the
people in trust for their common use and of common right, as an
93
incident to their sovereignty.

The “true doctrine” to which the Court is referring is the
doctrine of legislative discretion regarding the protection of
important public interests. The Court, however, made its doctrinal
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

100 U.S. 548 (1879).
Id. at 556.
Id.
Id. at 559.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 459–60 (emphasis added).
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analogy to a clearly “non-environmental” matter, and in doing so
demonstrated the wide range of public trust interests to which the
94
doctrine may apply.
The more recent expansion of the public and wildlife trust
doctrines to numerous other environmental resources also exhibits
that its common law application is not confined to the narrow
scope that some may argue it should have. The public trust
doctrine’s scope has been expanded to protect important
recreational, educational, scientific, and aesthetic resources in
95
which the public has been deemed to have an interest. Indeed,
the Supreme Court of Iowa recognized that the public trust
doctrine has “emerged from the watery depths [of navigable
waterways] to embrace the dry sand area of a beach, rural
parklands, a historic battlefield, wildlife, archaeological remains,
96
and even a downtown area.”
94. Id. at 460. The Court also introduced a temporal element into the analysis when it
stated, “[t]he legislation which may be needed one day for the harbor may be different from
the legislation that may be required at another day. Every legislature must, at the time of its
existence, exercise the power of the state in the execution of the trust devolved upon it.” Id.
This premise demonstrates that circumstances can change, and this principle should also
apply to which resources are considered subject to the trust in the first instance—the harbor in
Illinois today, the beachfront in South Carolina tomorrow. In fact, in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, the Court stated that “changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what was
previously permissible no longer so.” 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
95. Babcock, supra note 1, at 891. See also Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971)
(noting the “growing recognition” that the public trust doctrine applies to tidelands because
such lands “serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments
which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the
scenery and climate of the area”).
96. State v. Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Iowa 1989) (citing Richard Lazarus, Changing
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning The Public Trust Doctrine,
71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 632–33 (1986)). See also National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658
P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (public trust doctrine prevented Los Angeles from draining non-tidal
streams which fed a lake upon which wildlife depended); Eagle Envtl. II, L.P. v. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., 884 A.2d 867 (Pa. 2005) (applying the public trust doctrine to protect the
battlefield at Gettysburg). Furthermore, in Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 60 (Alaska 1996), the
Alaska Supreme Court noted that Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), overruled the
state ownership doctrine as it was presented in Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), for
the purpose of preventing interference with interstate commerce. Nonetheless, the court
noted that Hughes made clear that the state’s public trust responsibilities regarding wildlife
remained intact. The court went on to note that Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution
incorporated public trust responsibilities and “compel[led] the conclusion that fish
occurring in their natural state are property of the state for purposes of carrying out its trust
responsibilities.” Pullen, 923 P.2d at 60. The court then stated that “it is the authority to
control naturally occurring fish which gives the state property-like interests in these
resources. For that reason, naturally occurring salmon are, like other state natural resources,
state assets belonging to the state which controls them for the benefit of all of its people.” Id.
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This expansions of the doctrines have held up numerous times in
the face of Fifth Amendment takings claims. The wildlife trust
doctrine was originally used to protect government regulations that
restricted not only the killing of game, but also the harming of game
97
As early as 1881, the
from Fifth Amendment takings claims.
Illinois Supreme Court used language which indicated that not
only may states regulate the taking of wildlife, but may also regulate
harm which may occur to wildlife as reasonably judged by the
legislature:
So far as we are aware, it has never been judicially denied that the
government, under its police powers, may make regulations for the
preservation of game and fish, restricting their taking and
molestation . . . although laws to this effect, it is believed, have been in
force, in many of the older States since the organization of the
Federal government. . . . On the contrary, the constitutional right to
enact such laws has been expressly affirmed . . . .
And upon
principle, the right is clear.
The ownership being in the people of the State . . . and no
individual having any property rights to be affected, it necessarily
results, that the legislature, as the representative of the people of the
State, may withhold or grant to individuals the right to hunt and kill
game, or qualify and restrict it, as, in the opinions of its members, will

at 61. Another scholar stated regarding the expansion of the public trust doctrine:
In its early form, the public trust doctrine applied to submerged lands, the foreshore
and navigable waters and protected the public’s rights and interests in navigation,
fishing, and commerce. Since the 1970s, states and courts have extended the scope of
the doctrine to protect other public uses including hunting, boating, swimming,
bathing, and other recreational activities. Under the influence of changing public
perceptions, states have applied the public trust doctrine to preserve and protect
tidelands and other environments that provide food, shelter and habitat for birds and
marine life and that enhance the scenery and climate of certain areas. The
geographical reach of the doctrine has also been expanded. The public trust doctrine
now also encompasses non-navigable waters and streams as well as parks, land, wetlands
and wildlife. Thus, compared to its original scope, the public trust doctrine has been
expanded considerably.
EDWARD H.P. BRANS, LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES 51 (Kluwer Law
Int’l 2001) (citations omitted).
97. See infra notes 116–117 and accompanying text; see also infra note 134. The “harming”
of game in a legal sense may result from the destruction of habitat, which creates a
potentially far-reaching expansion of wildlife trust doctrine coverage beyond the actual
animals themselves. Such an expansion could potentially guard a much wider range of
environmental regulations from takings claims.
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best subserve the public welfare.

98

The focus on “harm” and “molestation” is important as these
terms arguably include harm or molestation resulting from habitat
destruction, thus bringing important ecological habitat under the
99
protection of the wildlife trust doctrine.
One scholar has even stated that “[i]t is thus apparent that courts
generally find no duty to compensate landowners for economic
losses that result from state or federal restrictions on the killing of
100
wildlife.”
Another scholar has noted that, if the wildlife trust
doctrine can be effectively asserted against takings claims, then
“[t]hose who care about protecting wildlife may find . . . that
wildlife laws may escape the Just Compensation Clause, thereby
101
taking out of harm’s way important wildlife habitat.” As discussed
below, some courts have been willing to extend the wildlife trust
doctrine, as a protection from Fifth Amendment takings claims,
beyond game animals. Protection has indeed already been
extended to animal habitat, as well as plants, in order to preserve
102
the important public interests provided by those resources.
The following cases demonstrate that the principles established
in Illinois Central and Geer extend beyond the protection of wildlife.
In these cases, courts used these doctrines to protect plants and the
overall habitats of both flora and fauna. Such an extension has
huge implications for expanding the scope of the public and
wildlife trust doctrines to protect various environmental regulations
from takings claims.
Barrett v. State provides one example that demonstrates the broad
authority of the government to regulate private land in the name of
103
In that case, plaintiffs
wildlife and environmental protection.
brought a takings claim against a New York statute that declared,
“[n]o person shall molest or disturb any wild beaver or the dams,
104
The court undertook an
houses, homes or abiding places of same.”
98. Magner v. People, 97 Ill. 320, 327 (1881) (emphasis added).
99. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
100. BEAN, supra note 53, at 37.
101. Babcock, supra note 1, at 903.
102. See, e.g., Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1917); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928); State v. Sour Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 78 (App. Div. 2000); Sierra Club v.
Dep’t of Forestry and Fire Protection, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 (Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (ordered
not published); National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
103. 116 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1917).
104. Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
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interesting and unusual analysis of the history of beavers in New
York, detailing the importance of that animal to the state. The
court noted that beavers were at one time “very numerous” in the
state of New York, but because of their great economic value, they
105
were killed almost to the point of extinction.
Plaintiffs claimed that vast acres of valuable timber were felled by
beavers, the population of which was recovering under the
106
The lower court found that the plaintiffs had incurred
statute.
damage of $1900 due to the beavers and granted plaintiffs that
107
amount in damages.
On the state’s appeal, the plaintiffs
maintained the following three claims: first, the state could not
protect an animal that was destructive; second, the 1904 law
prohibiting the molestation of beavers prohibited plaintiffs from
protecting their property, and thus was an unreasonable exercise of
the police power; and third, the state was in possession of the
beavers which had caused the damage and was thus liable for
108
damage caused by them.
The court responded by stating that “the general right of the
government to protect wild animals is too well established to be
now called into question. . . . Their preservation is a matter of
public interest. They are species of natural wealth which without
109
special protection would be destroyed.”
The court noted that
this power in New York dated back to 1705, when the colony passed
110
Despite the fact that
a similar act for the protection of deer.
individual landowners may be harmed, the court stated that such
regulation was “clearly a matter which is confided to [the
111
The court further found that “[t]he
legislature’s] discretion.”
state may exercise the police power ‘wherever the public interests
demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily
vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of
the public require, but what measures are necessary for the
112
protection of such interests.’” The court, echoing Illinois Central’s
focus on natural resources “of a special character” in which “the
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 101 (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894)) (emphasis added).
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whole people are interested,”

113

stated as follows:

The eagle is preserved, not for its use but for its beauty.
The same thing may be said of the beaver. They are one of the
most valuable of the fur-bearing animals of the state. They may be
used for food. But apart from these considerations their habits and
customs, their curious instincts and intelligence place them in a class
by themselves. Observation of the animals at work or play is a source
of never-failing interest and instruction. If they are to be preserved
114
experience has taught us that protection is required.

Thus, the court concluded that protecting beavers was within the
authority of the legislature, largely because protection was of great
115
As noted, not only was protecting
interest to the public at large.
the beaver a valid act, but so too was prohibiting molestation of the
beaver or its habitat since “[t]he destruction of dams and houses
116
According to this
w[ould] result in driving away the beaver.”
reasoning, not only may a state regulate the taking and molestation
of an animal itself, but also the habitat upon which the animal
depends. This is a clear expansion of wildlife protection towards
general environmental protection and is reflective of many state
and federal laws today.
Barrett is cited as an early manifestation of the public trust
doctrine’s application to wildlife for the purposes of defeating a
117
Perhaps more importantly, Barrett lays a historical
takings claim.
foundation for the expansion of the public trust doctrine to cover
general environmental concerns, rather than merely protecting the
taking or hunting of game animals. The holding in Barrett provides
an example of how modern courts may hold modern
environmental laws to be valid governmental measures to protect
important public interests without payment of “just compensation.”
118
decided in 1928, further
The case of Miller v. Schoene,
113. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453–54 (1892).
114. Barrett, 116 N.E. at 101.
115. Id. at 102.
116. Id. at 101.
117. Caspersen, supra note 9, at 382.
118. 276 U.S. 272 (1928). The Court, in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, construed Miller as
one of several cases establishing the denial of takings claims when the state uses its police
power to regulate activities that are “akin to public nuisances.” 505 U.S. 1003, 1022 (1992);
see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (state prohibited the manufacture of alcoholic
beverages); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (state barred the operation of a
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demonstrates the broad authority of states to regulate private
property to prevent environmental degradation without incurring
compensation liability under a Takings Clause analysis. In Miller,
119
plaintiffs challenged the Cedar Rust Act of Virginia, which gave
the government the authority to force private property owners to
cut trees to prevent the spread of a plant disease. The state
entomologists had ordered plaintiffs to cut a large number of trees
on their own property to protect an apple orchard on an adjoining
120
Plaintiffs claimed this was a violation of their
property.
121
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
The Court first noted the importance of apple harvesting in the
state of Virginia as the state’s economy was highly dependent upon
orchards. The Court found that given the purpose of the statute,
to protect the apple economy, the state was necessarily forced to
choose between “the preservation of one class of property and that
122
of the other.” The Court reasoned that “[w]hen forced to such a
choice the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by
brick mill in a residential area); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (state
effectively prevented continued operation of a quarry in a residential area). In Lucas, the
Court actually rejected this use of the state’s police power, despite having upheld such a use
under the circumstances of Miller. However, given the blurry line between the use of the
police power to protect the public from harm and the use of the public trust doctrine to
preserve interests important to the public, Miller could equally be construed as the latter. It
has been noted that
[i]t is sometimes difficult to fix boundary stones between the private right of property
and the police power . . . . But it is recognized that the State as quasi-sovereign and
representative of the interests of the public has a standing in court to protect the
atmosphere, the water and the forests within its territory, irrespective of the assent or
dissent of the private owners of the land most immediately concerned.
Babcock, supra note 1, at 876. See also infra notes 191–193 and accompanying text. The
Court in Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 527–28 (1896), and the Minnesota and Illinois
courts it cites, seems to assert that use of the police power to protect animals is synonymous
with use of the wildlife trust doctrine.
119. The statute stated that it was
unlawful for any person to ‘own, plant or keep alive and standing’ on his premises any
red cedar tree which is or may be the source or ‘host plant’ of the communicable plant
disease known as cedar rust, and any such tree growing within a certain radius of any
apple orchard is declared to be a public nuisance, subject to destruction.
Miller, 276 U.S. at 277.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 279.
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deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to
save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater
123
Apple harvesting was “one of the principal
value to the public.”
agricultural pursuits in Virginia” and the statewide value of red
cedars was “shown to be small as compared with that of the apple
124
The Court therefore dismissed the
orchards of the state.”
contention that this “case is merely one of a conflict of two private
interests,” and instead found it “obvious that there may be, and that
there is, a preponderant public concern in the preservation of the
125
one interest over the other.”
Thus, the Court ruled that the
public interest in protecting apple orchards superseded the interest
of the private landowner in keeping his trees, and that the state
acted legitimately to protect the more important resource in such a
126
circumstance.
Perhaps most interestingly, the Court in Miller decided that it
need not “weigh with nicety the question of whether the infected
cedars constitute a nuisance according to the common law or
whether they may be so declared by statute,” because where “the
choice is unavoidable, we cannot say that exercise [of the police
power], controlled by considerations of social policy which are not
127
Thus, the
unreasonable, involves any denial of due process.”
Court reasoned that the takings issue could be decided not on the
basis of nuisance, but on the basis of the general public policy
interests at stake. This assertion by the Court is particularly
intriguing, especially considering how the legal analysis of takings
128
law has become increasingly opaque in modern times.
In Miller,
the Court made clear that protection of significant public interests
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 280.
Id. The Lucas dissent also noted a parallel to Miller when it stated that

the Court has relied in the past, as the South Carolina court has done here, on
legislative judgments of what constitutes a harm . . . . In Miller, the Court adopted the
exact approach of the South Carolina court: It found the cedar trees harmful, and their
destruction not a taking, whether or not they were a nuisance.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1053 n.17 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In
other words, the dissent argued that legislatures can use the police power to determine what
constitutes harm and can pass legislation pursuant to those findings that is impervious to
takings claims. See infra note 164.
128. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.
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could justify regulation of private property for environmental
purposes, not only by prohibiting landowners from engaging in
certain activities, but even to the point of requiring affirmative acts
129
by a private landowner to destroy the landowner’s own property.
In addition to the early twentieth century cases, at least two postLucas courts have allowed states to assert the public and wildlife
129. Other cases also demonstrate how courts have invoked “reasonable social policy” to
uphold legal protections for important resources pursuant to the public and wildlife trust
doctrines. In the 1919 case State v. Pollock, the Supreme Court of North Dakota ruled on the
validity of a law that criminalized the possession of certain fish between the months of March
and May. 175 N.W. 557, 558 (N.D. 1919). Plaintiffs contended that the statute was an
unconstitutional interference with the right of U.S. citizens to “acquire and protect property,
in that any statute which interferes with this right, except in cases where the public health,
morals, or safety or the general welfare authorizes such restrictions as an exercise of police
power, is . . . unconstitutional and void.” Id. The court noted the historical roots of state
control over wildlife when it stated that
the ownership of game being in the first instance lodged in the people of the state, may
be reserved by them . . . . Any ownership which an individual is allowed to acquire may
be subject to such conditions and limitations as the people acting through their
legislative agents, may wish to impose. . . . This power of the state is based largely on the
circumstance that the property right to the wild game within its borders is vested in the
people of the state in their sovereign capacity; and as an exercise of its police powers
and to protect its property for the benefit of its citizens, it is not only the right but it is
the duty of the state to take such steps as shall preserve the game . . . . [C]onsequently
nothing is taken from the individual and his constitutional rights are not infringed . . . .
Id. at 559 (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Similar to the
Court in Miller, the court in Pollock made an interesting policy valuation in this passage,
stating that governments not only have the legal right to regulate the environment, but also
have the affirmative duty to preserve the public’s proprietary environmental interests. The
court found that the government’s exercise of its duty does not infringe upon individual
constitutional rights, which would presumably include the right to claim a taking without just
compensation. Another case which demonstrates the focus on social policy regarding
environmental regulation is Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). In Toomer, the Court
augmented the legal “ownership” analysis which courts had previously used to justify state
regulation of wildlife, and blatantly asserted that policy considerations regarding the public
interest were in and of themselves sufficient support for valid environmental regulation.
Toomer involved an assertion by Georgia shrimpers that South Carolina statutes regulating
commercial shrimp fishing off the coast of South Carolina were unconstitutional. See id. at
389–91. South Carolina defended its regulations by invoking an historical line of laws
regarding wildlife ownership—beginning in Roman times and as passed on to individual
states by colonial governments. Id. at 399–401. The Court stated that “[t]he whole
ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal
shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate
the exploitation of an important resource.” Id. at 402. As in Miller, the Court indicated that
the necessary ingredient for protecting environmental regulations from takings claims was
that plaintiffs demonstrate a state interest in preserving the environment, as an “important
resource,” for the people as a whole. Id.
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trust doctrines as common law background principles of property
law, pursuant to Lucas, as a defense to takings claims brought
against environmental regulations protecting a broad spectrum of
130
natural resources. The court in State v. Sour Mountain Realty, Inc.
rejected a takings claim by owners of property who had been
ordered to remove fences which kept threatened snakes from
reaching their habitat. The court found that “[t]he State’s interest
in protecting its wild animals is a venerable principle that can
131
In
properly serve as a legitimate basis” for denying the claim.
132
Sierra Club v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection, a timber
harvest permit was denied to a plaintiff because harvesting would
have caused habitat destruction that would have threatened various
endangered species. The court found that “wildlife regulation of
some sort has been historically a part of the preexisting law of
133
property.”
The above cases demonstrate that courts have found a wide range
of public environmental interests to be paramount to private
property rights. These precedents have great implications for
modern takings jurisprudence in the area of environmental
regulation. The cases establish that the public and wildlife trust
doctrines, as background principles of property law, may be used to
shield environmental regulations protecting a variety of important
public resources from the takings claims brought by private
property owners. If jurisprudence in this area were to continue to
develop in this direction, the outcome of a case similar to Lucas
might be quite different. Because the statute at issue in Lucas was
enacted in part to protect endangered species that depend on
coastal habitat for survival, an extension of wildlife trust principles
to that habitat might have saved the regulation from the takings
134
A closer look at Lucas, with specific emphasis on a firstclaim.
130. 714 N.Y.S.2d 78 (App. Div. 2000).
131. Id. at 84. Some modern commentators on the public trust doctrine have asserted
that it should be used as a tool for large scale ecological preservation, rather than just
targeting species on a case by case basis. Caspersen, supra note 9, at 375.
132. 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 (Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (ordered not published).
133. Id. at 347.
134. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. This statement is further supported by
the premise put forth in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, 639 F.2d
495 (9th Cir. 1981). The limits of this premise have not been identified by the Supreme
Court since, arguably, the legal theory driving Palila was only partially tested by the Supreme
Court in Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). In Palila, plaintiffs charged that the state
was taking an endangered bird species in violation of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).
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time review of the oral arguments presented during the Lucas
remand, will further demonstrate this point.
III. THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE LUCAS REMAND AND THE INHERENT
NATURE OF THE PUBLIC AND WILDLIFE TRUST DOCTRINES
A. Background
th

Given the property law precedents established in the late 19 and
th
early 20 centuries, it is important to analyze whether the public
and wildlife trust doctrines would provide a defense against the
current trend of resistance to environmental protection measures,
like the regulation at issue in Lucas.
In 1986 David Lucas purchased two residential lots, with the
135
purported intention of building single-family homes. In 1988 the
South Carolina legislature enacted the Beachfront Management
Act (“BMA”) in order to protect the South Carolina coast as a
source of a variety of valuable uses and resources (the creation of a
storm barrier, the generation of tourism, and the protection of
both habitat for threatened and endangered species and vegetation
136
The
crucial to the survival of the shoreline ecosystem).
legislature found that these uses and resources were increasingly
threatened by development occurring along beachfront properties,
and such development had increasingly caused the erosion of
137
Thus, the legislature passed the BMA to “protect
coastal lands.
the quality of the coastal environment and to promote the
economic and social improvement of the coastal zone and of all the
138
The legislature amended the BMA in 1990
people of the State.”

639 F.2d at 496. The state maintained a population of sheep and goats for sport hunting,
but these animals destroyed the native forest upon which the bird depended. Id. In its
analysis, the court applied the Fish and Wildlife Service’s regulatory definition of “harm”
under the ESA, which includes activity that degrades or destroys an endangered animal’s
habitat. Id. at 497. The court concluded that the state caused harm to the Palila’s habitat
and therefore its actions violated the ESA. Id. at 497–98. Application of the ESA to a parcel
of property arguably makes bringing a successful takings claim much more difficult. Since,
in the Lucas case, the South Carolina legislature enacted its regulation in part to protect
endangered species which depend on coastal habitat for survival, the wildlife trust doctrine
could potentially be used to bolster the protection of such regulations from takings claims.
135. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992).
136. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10–48-39-30 (2008).
137. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-20; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022 n.10.
138. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-20.
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to include an administrative remedy allowing the South Carolina
Coastal Council (“Council”) to issue special use permits under
139
some circumstances.
Because the BMA barred Lucas from erecting homes on his
property, Lucas argued that it constituted a taking of his property
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
140
Constitution.
The trial court agreed, finding that Lucas’s
141
However, the Supreme
property had been rendered “valueless.”
Court of South Carolina reversed, holding that the BMA was a valid
use of the state’s police power.
The case ultimately made its way to the United States Supreme
Court, where Justice Scalia began his analysis by noting the oftquoted language in Pennsylvania Coal that “while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
142
The Court then established yet another
recognized as a taking.”
nuance of takings jurisprudence, explaining that a regulation
which strips property of all economic value is categorically a taking
143
However, the Court’s holding also
requiring just compensation.
established an exception to the rule, stating that:
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only
if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s
estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title
to begin with.
....
. . . Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the
restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property
and nuisance already place upon land ownership. 144

Without such a requirement, the Court found, a private property
owner would have no notice that the value of his or her property

139. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D)(1).
140. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
141. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
142. Id. at 1014 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
143. Id. at 1016–18. Scalia claimed that this was not a new aspect of takings law.
However, others have asserted that the holding in Lucas is indeed a new slant on the takings
analysis. See, e.g., Babcock, supra note 1 at 850–51.
144. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027, 1029.
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145

could potentially be eliminated. Thus, the Court asserted that in
order for South Carolina to avoid compensating Lucas, it would
need to prove on remand to the South Carolina Supreme Court
that the purposes of the BMA were supported by background
principles of South Carolina’s law of property or nuisance.
B. The Lucas Remand
On remand to the state supreme court, the state of South
Carolina made little attempt to formulate the argument that the
Lucas decision required before the state could avoid compensating
for the BMA. Less than a month after the United States Supreme
Court handed down its decision, the Council filed a “Motion to
Clarify Remand,” in which the Council requested that the South
Carolina Supreme Court consider three issues: 1) whether Lucas
could obtain a special use permit from the Council pursuant to the
1990 amendments to the BMA, 2) whether a total or temporary
taking had occurred, including a determination of damages, if any,
and 3) whether there were any background principles of nuisance
146
The Council
or property law that would deny a takings claim.
further asked the court to grant “permission to the parties to
submit briefs or orally argue the positions concerning the
framework for remand in order to insure that this case is brought
147
to a speedy and conclusive end.” Lucas’s counsel filed a “Motion
on Remand from the United States Supreme Court,” which focused
primarily on proving economic loss. Lucas claimed that his use of
the property would not constitute a nuisance and asserted that the
148
trial court’s grant of damages should be affirmed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court ultimately granted an oral
argument for the case, which was held on November 18, 1992.
During oral argument, the opening statement given by one justice
was quite telling regarding the subsequently misdirected
development of the arguments, and especially the arguments of the
145. Id. at 1027–28.
146. See generally Motion to Clarify Remand, South Carolina Coastal Council, Appellant,
Jul. 23, 1992, at 2–4, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 309 S.C. 424 (Case No. 90–38) (on file
with South Carolina Supreme Court Library).
147. Id. at 4.
148. See generally Motion on Remand from the United States Supreme Court, David H.
Lucas, Respondent, Aug. 20, 1992, at 4–8, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 309 S.C. 424 (Case
No. 90–38) (on file with South Carolina Supreme Court Library) [hereinafter Motion on
Remand].
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Council:
We really are not too sure that the things that you have filed really
address what is concerning the court. This matter was remanded to
this court, and the purpose for having this hearing is to hear from
Coastal Council and from counsel for Mr. Lucas regarding your
interpretation of what the United States Supreme Court is requiring
the South Carolina Supreme Court to do. We don’t think it would be
beneficial to hear you reargue your position that you argued before,
because the United States Supreme Court has determined that that is
149
not the law in this case.

Thus the court highlighted that the motion filed by the Council
was not adequately responsive to the directive handed down by the
United States Supreme Court. Even so, the Council opened the
argument by addressing those same unresponsive issues. Contrary
to the third prong of the motion it filed, the Council failed to
mention any intention to discuss background principles of property
law that would allow the state to overcome Lucas’s takings claim.
Instead, the Council focused primarily on the special permit issue
and whether or not there was a total or temporary taking
150
In essence, the Council argued that the
warranting damages.
United States Supreme Court never definitively ruled that there was
a total taking, and that no total taking existed because Lucas had
not yet exhausted administrative remedies by applying for a special
use permit under the 1990 amendments to the BMA. The Council
argued that as a result, the only question was whether a temporary
taking occurred between the passage of the original BMA in 1988
and the amendments to the BMA in 1990. The Council asserted
that any temporary taking should only result in de minimis damages
since Lucas did not suffer any substantial, actual damages. Then
the Council requested that the matter be remanded to them to
151
decide whether a special use permit should be issued.
149. Audio tape: Oral argument before the South Carolina Supreme Court on remand
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council (see 505 U.S. 1003) (Nov.
18, 1992) (on file with South Carolina Supreme Court Library).
150. Id.
151. Id. The Council argued that actual damages for the temporary take should be based
on four factors: that Lucas was 1) able to use the property, 2) intended to use the property,
3) had the capacity to begin construction, and 4) could provide an end date for the
construction. The Council argued there was nothing in the record to show the regulation
from 1988 to 1990 did Lucas any harm. Lucas maintained a vacant lot, and as a consequence
the Council asserted that he may not have ever had plans to build during the two year period
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Responding to Council’s argument that administrative remedies
had not been exhausted under the 1990 BMA, and that the court
should determine damages due for a temporary taking, one justice
stated:
But that case is not before us, is it . . . ? [Lucas] has not made an
application to [the] Coastal Council. How can we remand a man
when he has not made an application? . . . [T]he “total take”
[question] . . . is not in front of us, is it? The only thing that is in
front of us is the impact of the 1988 Beachfront Management Act.
Both parties asked us to let them amend the pleadings or amend the
appeal to bring in the 1990 Act. We declined to do that. So what we
have in front of us is the effect of the ‘88 Act only. Isn’t that correct?
Well then, how could [the] Coastal Council ever be involved in
152
that?

Another justice evidenced similar frustration by asking, “wouldn’t
you agree that up until this court makes some decision about this
matter as a result of the United States Supreme Court, [Lucas]
couldn’t do anything . . . regarding those two lots, could he?” The
justice further inquired how Lucas could have possibly applied for
a permit under the 1990 Act since this court, in its decision in the
case prior to the United States Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari,
held that his proposed activities were properly barred by the 1988
153
Act.
Even after the court pointed out that the Council’s arguments
were misguided and failed to address the issue for which the
Supreme Court issued the remand, the Council persisted in its
original argument. The Council continued to concede that there
was some form of taking, though only temporary, and that the de
minimis damages for that taking should be determined by the court.
In short, the Council proved to be completely unprepared and did
not even attempt to argue the validity of the BMA on the basis of
background principles of property law as the United States
154
Supreme Court had required.
in the first instance. As such, the Council argued that any damages awarded for the
temporary take should be negligible. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. In fact, the Council seemed primarily focused on the need for quick resolution of
the case. In response to the South Carolina Supreme Court’s suggestion that the Council
was incorrect regarding the procedural posture of the case when it requested a remand to
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Even when directly asked by the South Carolina Supreme Court to
argue the United States Supreme Court’s “background principles”
directive, the Council failed to effectively address the issue. Most
strikingly, one justice actually invited the Council to argue
application of the public trust doctrine to the BMA:
Would you propose to justify [the BMA] on the basis of some
common law doctrine of . . . noxious use or on some public trust
doctrine? . . . [T]he Supreme Court forbids you to justify the
regulation on the basis of the ‘88 Beach Management Act. They say if
you are going to completely prohibit use under that Act, then you
have “taken,” certainly for that period of time . . . . [T]hey leave open
the question of whether you could justify that regulatory taking on
some common law basis, which presumably would include public trust . . . .
But as a practical matter, what else would you really have to say
besides that, to justify the regulatory taking in the face of what the
155
Supreme Court said . . . ?

Thus the court itself suggested that the Council could legitimately
argue for the application of the public trust doctrine pursuant to
the Supreme Court’s directive, possibly saving the BMA and the
resources it protected from Lucas’s takings claim. Instead, the
Council only focused briefly on the nuisance portion of the
Supreme Court’s directive. For instance, one justice asked the
Council, “Can you even attempt to prove any kind of common law
nuisance? . . . The only way you’re going to be able to prevail is you
are going to have to prove that something in his title would prevent
156
him from building. You are out of the ballpark on that, right?”
The Council then basically capitulated, declaring that it was
unprepared to make a nuisance argument and that this was a “very
the agency, the Council stated “if we could actually deal with the temporary damages
issue . . . we would all be better off in terms of the length of time the trial took. But again I
cannot change court procedure.” Furthermore, the Council’s attorney made numerous
statements that arguably indicated not only a lack of vigorous representation, but also a lack
of understanding of the United States Supreme Court’s decision. Regarding the requested
remand to the Council on the special permit issue, which a justice pointed out was not a
question before the court, the Council stated, “I’ve found of late that some of my legal
conclusions may not be the best in the world . . . I’ve certainly had my share of . . .
misunderstandings of the law in the course of my career.” Id. Counsel also responded to
opposing counsel’s suggestion to settle the case by stating that, “[f]or me personally, I’d
almost say ‘sure’ and write him a check myself . . . I cannot speak for my fourteen member
board.” Id.
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. Id.
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157

difficult hurdle for the Council to overcome.”
When the Council finally attempted to make an improvised
nuisance argument, one justice highlighted the futility of that
argument by stating that there are “fine homes built on both sides
of . . . these two lots. There is no way in the world you are going to
be able to establish that . . . a nuisance is going to be created there
158
The Council once again reverted to
by building a home . . . .”
the primary arguments it established in its motion and finally
concluded by simply stating that it “would like to get this matter
resolved in the fashion of an appropriate remand or just a
conclusion that [Lucas] did not effectively, at trial, prove that there
159
was a total taking.”
Ultimately, the oral arguments before the South Carolina
Supreme Court exhibited a failure on the part of the Council to
adequately address the question that the United States Supreme
Court directed it to address on remand. Most importantly, at the
same time that the Council failed to make a public trust argument
in order to save the BMA, the court itself suggested the use of the
public trust doctrine as a potential background principle of
property law that might overcome takings claims brought against
regulations protecting upland coastal resources in South Carolina.
However, the Council was unprepared to accept the court’s
invitation to argue the public trust doctrine, and therefore missed
an important opportunity to establish a strong public trust
precedent for the defense of such environmental regulations in
response to the Lucas decision.
Given the misdirected arguments made by the Council, it is not
surprising that the court ruled in favor of Lucas, who argued that
“[b]ecause ‘background principles of nuisance and property law’ in
South Carolina do not prohibit construction of a conforming and
similarly situated residence in an area zoned residential, there is no
160
The
need to remand this case for further evidentiary findings.”
court gave short shrift to the matter, stating in its final order:
We have reviewed the record and heard arguments from the parties
157. Id.
158. Id. Lucas’s counsel also focused solely on the nuisance directive issued by the
Supreme Court, and never responded to the background principle of property law directive,
which would have potentially covered the public trust doctrine.
159. Id.
160. Motion on Remand, supra note 148, at 5.
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regarding whether Coastal Council possesses the ability under the
common law to prohibit Lucas from constructing a habitable
structure on his land. Coastal Council has not persuaded us that any
common law basis exists by which it could restrain Lucas’s desired use
of his land. 161

By failing to present an argument based on the public trust
doctrine, the Council forced the court to “ignore[ ] the second
part of the exception for ‘background principles of property
law,’ . . . [by] not analyz[ing] possible public trust rights in the
162
beach front property.”
Ultimately, the Lucas remand demonstrates that the South
Carolina Supreme Court understood the United States Supreme
Court’s decision to allow state assertion of the public trust doctrine
as a background principle of property law in order to defend the
BMA. This point is particularly important considering that the
BMA protected a variety of resources over which the state of South
Carolina had never before asserted public trust authority. South
Carolina common law at the time of Lucas included public trust
protection of navigable waters and tidal lands, but had never before
incorporated public trust protection of species’ habitat, shoreline
163
The South
vegetation, and other upland coastal resources.
Carolina Supreme Court’s invitation to the state indicates that state
courts, in their role as author of state common law property rights,
161. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992).
162. Caspersen, supra note 9, at 373.
163. In the most recent South Carolina case upholding public trust protection for
navigable waters and tidal lands, a landowner claimed that he was deprived of all
economically beneficial use of his property due to wetlands regulations, and so was owed 5th
Amendment takings compensation. McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 589 S.E.2d 116, cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 982 (2003). In denying the claim the court noted the longstanding South
Carolina common law tradition of applying public trust principles to navigable waters and
tidal lands, stating that
South Carolina has a long line of cases regarding the public trust doctrine in the
context of land bordering navigable waters. Historically, the State holds presumptive
title to land below the high water mark. As stated by this Court in 1884, not only does
the State hold title to this land in jus privatum, it holds it in jus publicum, in trust for the
benefit of all the citizens of this State.
Id. at 119 (internal citations omitted). Another South Carolina Supreme Court case,
decided over four years prior to Lucas, applied the public trust doctrine to protect streams
and marshland from impoundment by the South Carolina Coastal Council. State ex rel.
Medlock v. S.C. Coastal Council, 346 S.E.2d 716 (1986). On remand, the state did not argue
the relevance of any of the above cited cases.

0.6. HUDSON.34.1 NO BANNER

136

3/9/2009 1:58:31 PM

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 34:1

can permit the evolution of background principles over time, even
164
in the absence of prior state precedent.
But what of federal courts? Do they have a role to play in
applying these doctrines? In Lucas, the United States Supreme
Court gave no indication that it considered the application of
public trust principles or that it would have upheld the South
Carolina statute had the state made a public trust argument. In
fact, the Court focused primarily on nuisance as one example of
background principles and failed to highlight other examples,
which it could have done by acknowledging its own precedent
establishing the public and wildlife trust doctrines as background
principles of property law (Illinois Central and Geer). Under the
circumstances presented in Lucas, consideration of these principles
is clearly warranted. For instance, given that the South Carolina
legislature focused on wildlife habitat, vegetation, and general
165
protection of the coastal zone as reasons for passage of the BMA,
the public and wildlife trust doctrines were clearly relevant to the
outcome of the state’s case under the “background principles”
analysis of Lucas. In other words, the BMA is itself evidence that
164. In fact, scholars have highlighted that positive legislative enactments, like the
Beachfront Management Act, may also constitute “background principles” of property law,
and that courts need not be limited by prior state court precedent. One scholar noted that
the Lucas Court
insisted that a newly enacted land use restriction must be solidly grounded in the[ ] ageold principles [of property and nuisance law] if it is to be considered an inherent
limitation on title. In fact, the Court also spoke of ‘newly decreed’ limitations on land
use—a phrase that at least intimates that the application of existing legislation may
require compensation if it goes beyond the limitations inherent in common law
principles . . . . In my view, the scope of the exception to the total takings rule should
not be defined (or limited) solely by reference to common law principles. Statutes have
historically played an important role in establishing the contours of private property
rights, and the Court does not, in other contexts, distinguish between state law derived
from legislation and state common law. Moreover, nothing about the genesis of
common law principles so distinguishes the common law from legislation that we should
privilege it above statutes in determining whether a particular land use entitlement was
inherent in an owner’s title.
Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the Common Law: Considering Inherent Limitations on Title,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5–7 (1996). See also Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely
Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
321, 354–61 (2005) (discussing state and federal court cases holding that statutes,
regulations, and constitutional provisions can constitute background principles of property
and nuisance law).
165. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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the legislature sought to protect resources in trust for the public
and, had the state made such an argument, the specific application
of the BMA in question may have survived the takings claim.
Scholars have noted:
The reasoning in . . . Lucas . . . suggests the possibility that land use
restrictions may be imposed without offending the Fifth Amendment
if they are aimed at protecting wildlife . . . . However, if the land use
restriction inheres in the landowner’s title, no compensation is owed.
This qualification leaves open the possibility that because a
landowner’s property right has never been construed to extend to
wildlife, and because under old English law the rights of private
landowners were constrained by obligations to protect wildlife and its
habitat, restrictions to protect wildlife will not require
166
compensation.

Given the apparent relevance of the public and wildlife trust
doctrines to takings analysis, as demonstrated by the Lucas remand,
and the early establishment of public and wildlife trust precedent
in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, why did the United
States Supreme Court fail to consider these doctrines under the
circumstances that Lucas presented?
It is possible that the majority of the Court—if they considered
the issue—doubted that these doctrines were background
principles under South Carolina’s law of property because South
Carolina’s public trust protections at common law did not extend
beyond navigable waters and tidal lands. As noted, the state of
South Carolina had never before declared, nor had it historically
viewed the upland coastal resources at issue in Lucas as protected
167
It is a long-settled premise that
by the public trust doctrine.
168
Indeed, the
federal courts do not craft state common law.
United States Supreme Court makes it very clear that the
background principles that should determine the outcome of a
particular case are “background principles of the State’s law of
169
property,” not background principles recognized by other states.
In this view, principles of public trust protection for upland coastal
resources may very well be background principles of property law

166.
167.
168.
169.

BEAN, supra note 53, at 38.
The author could not locate any cases directly on point on this issue.
See, e.g., Murdoch v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 608 (1875).
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (emphasis added).
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in Oregon or Maine, but not of South Carolina.
Similarly,
the Court might recognize the wildlife trust doctrine as a
173
background principle of property law in New York, but deem that
of little relevance to the law of property in South Carolina. Such an
outcome might be necessary due to the issue of notice, as
recognizing one state’s public or wildlife trust doctrine as a
background principle of another state’s common law might deprive
174
the property owner of notice of important risks to ownership.
This argument, although with surface appeal, fails to recognize
that the public and wildlife trust doctrines are principles very much
akin to the police power, arising from the inherent sovereignty of
each and every state. Because of this “background principle,” a
state government can act on those powers via its legislative
authority at whatever point in time the state deems necessary—
whether it be 1788 or 1988. In fact, the public trust doctrine and
the police power have been analogized in this way by the United
175
In both Illinois Central and Geer, the
States Supreme Court.
Court’s approach assumed that both the public and wildlife trust
doctrines inhere in all property in the U.S. prior to the transfer of
that property to private hands. As a result, these doctrines became
“background principles of property law” in each and every state.
This inherency not only allows state courts to apply the doctrines in
an evolving fashion over time, but also allows federal courts to
uphold state application of the doctrines even in the absence of
prior state precedent. Such precedent may not be available if the
state is seeking to apply the doctrines for the first time or in a new
fashion to previously unprotected resources. However, federal
court action is appropriate because the underlying public and
wildlife trust background principles, as required by Lucas, remain
perpetually available for invocation by any state that is party to a
federal case.
Environmental legislation passed pursuant to these doctrines, in
a non-arbitrary fashion and with appropriate parameters as
determined by the courts, should, therefore, be immune from
takings claims under the circumstances presented in a case like
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 835 P.2d 940, 942 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 172 (Me. 1989).
See supra note 163.
See generally Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1917).
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–28.
See infra notes 177–184 and accompanying text.
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Lucas. Furthermore, state legislatures enacting environmental
regulations should be allowed to emulate other states’ legislative
applications of the public and wildlife trust doctrines regardless of
whether those fact-specific applications had previously been a part
of the enacting state’s common law of property.
C. Inherent Doctrines: Applying the Public and Wildlife Trust
Doctrines Non-Exclusively
The Court in Illinois Central stated that the public trust is
embedded in states as a part of “their inherent sovereignty” and
that “any act of legislation concerning [the use of lands subject to
176
The Court’s statement
the trust] affects the public welfare.”
indicates that this governmental prerogative and inherent common
law principle vested in each state equally at the time of its creation;
in other words as a “background principle of property law.” As
such, the public and wildlife trust doctrines are pre-existing
principles that inhere in each landowner’s title to property,
regardless of the state in which the landowner owns property.
Not only did this sovereignty inhere with regard to the general
authority of states to act pursuant to the public trust doctrine, but
also with regard to the specific natural resources a state chooses to
protect. A parallel can be drawn between use of the public trust
doctrine and use of the police power—just as all state legislatures
can enact different zoning regulations pursuant to the police
power, they are able to make determinations on what constitutes a
public trust-protected resource without first having it declared a
common law principle by the particular state’s court.
The parallel between the police power and public trust doctrine
is made clear by the statement in Illinois Central that the state “can
no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people
are interested . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the
177
Thus, the Court analogizes
administration of government . . . .”
the inherent nature of state public trust power with that of the
police power. The police power, like the public trust doctrine,
178
inhered in all states equally at the time of state establishment,
and therefore one state may act pursuant to the police power in a
176. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 459 (1892).
177. Id. at 453.
178. See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (stating that “the Founders denied the
National Government [the police power] and reposed [it] in the States”).
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non-exclusive fashion. For example, the South Carolina legislature
could enact legislation under its police power which emulated a
North Carolina law, regardless of whether South Carolina courts
had previously incorporated the specific subject of legislation into
South Carolina common law. The only role of the courts in such
circumstances is to ensure that the legislature’s use of the police
179
power is not arbitrary or unreasonable.
The Supreme Court validated the general applicability of
inherent powers in the context of the police power in Village of
180
There the Court paved the way for
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
federal courts to uphold state laws invoking the public or wildlife
trust doctrines for protection of resources regardless of whether
those doctrines had been previously invoked by the state to protect
the same or similar resources. Euclid involved a constitutional
181
challenge to zoning regulations passed by the local government.
As is often the case with environmental regulation, the claimants
argued that zoning was an unreasonable intrusion on their private
property rights and that the government should not use zoning to
182
restrict the use of their property. The Supreme Court disagreed,
ruling that zoning was a proper exercise of the state’s inherent
police power. The Court noted that “it must be said before the
ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions
are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial
183
relation to” the proper exercise of the inherent police power.
Though the case arose in the state of Ohio, the Court’s ruling

179. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
180. 272 U.S. 365. In fact, scholars have observed the parallel between the inherent
police power (and zoning laws passed pursuant to it) and Lucas “background principles” by
noting that
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Tahoe-Sierra helps identify the types of regulations
that are sufficiently traditional in scope to be background principles of property law. . . .
[T]he Chief Justice conceded that at least some ‘valid zoning and land-use’ regulations
are insulated from takings liability under Lucas’s background principles framework. The
Chief Justice explained that ‘zoning and permit regimes are a longstanding feature of
state property law’ . . . .
Blumm, supra note 164, at 358 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 352 (2002)).
181. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 395.
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applies to all states because each state was vested with the police
184
power at the time of the state’s creation. It was not necessary that
each and every state in the union bring a separate zoning case prior
to enacting zoning regulations pursuant to the police power; the
police power is considered both a background principle and
general tool of common law legislative authority.
Similarly, the Illinois Central Court made numerous additional
statements indicating that the public and wildlife trust doctrines
are inherent background principles of common law property
vested in each and every state upon its creation. At the outset of its
analysis, the Court made clear that “[t]he state of Illinois was
admitted into the Union . . . on equal footing with the original
185
states, in all respects.” The Court also noted that states need not
be subject to principles of exclusivity in exercising public trust
sovereignty when it stated that “[t]here can be no distinction
between the several states of the Union in the character of their
jurisdiction, sovereignty, and dominion which they may possess and
186
exercise over persons and subjects within their respective limits.”
The Court further noted that:
It is . . . settled law of this country that the ownership of and
dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, within
the limits of the several states, belong to the respective states within
which they are found . . . .
The same doctrine is . . . applicable to lands covered by fresh water
187
in the Great Lakes.

The Court thus asserted that the public trust in this particular
resource, lake beds, inhered in all states in this regard, not just the
state of Illinois. As a result, it is clear that lake beds in the state of
South Carolina could be similarly protected by the state legislature
without the express prior approval of the South Carolina state
188
Furthermore, since it appears that submerged lands are
courts.

184. See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 n.8 (2000) (stating that “the principle that
[t]he Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers, while reserving a
generalized police power to the States, is deeply ingrained in our constitutional history”)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
185. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 434 (1892).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 435.
188. But see supra note 163.
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but one resource which may be protected pursuant to the public
trust doctrine, the South Carolina legislature should be able to
protect wildlife, habitat, coasts, and other resources accordingly.
In addition to Illinois Central, Geer provides perhaps the strongest
evidence that the Supreme Court did not regard the public or
wildlife trust doctrines as doctrines to examine purely within the
precedential confines of independent state jurisdictions. Indeed,
as discussed below, the Geer Court did what has here been
suggested—the Court looked to the wildlife trust doctrine as
exercised in other states and applied it to a state which had never
previously incorporated those fact-specific applications of the
doctrine into its common law jurisprudence.
The Geer Court cited courts in three different states for the
proposition that the state of Connecticut could enact a regulation
for the protection of wildlife. In contrast, the Court cited no case
from the state of Connecticut, and it appears that no Connecticut
court had ever before considered the specific wildlife trust doctrine
189
just as South Carolina had never
application in question;
considered the application of the public trust doctrine to upland
coastal resources prior to Lucas.
First, the Geer Court recognized “a well-considered opinion of the
supreme court of California,” which had ruled that:
The wild game within a state belongs to the people in their
collective sovereign capacity. It is not the subject of private
ownership, except in so far as the people may elect to make it so; and
they may, if they see fit, absolutely prohibit the taking of it, or traffic
and commerce in it, if it is deemed necessary for the protection or
preservation of the public good. 190

Next, the Court noted that “the same view ha[d] been expressed
by the Supreme Court of Minnesota,” which stated that:
The preservation of such animals . . . is a matter of public interest,
and it is within the police power of the state, as the representative of
the people in their united sovereignty, to make such laws as will best
preserve such game, and secure its beneficial use in the future to the

189. The author could not locate any cases that indicated that Connecticut had
previously considered the issue in question in Geer.
190. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896) (citing Ex parte Maier, 37 P. 402, 402
(Cal. 1894)).
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citizens; and to that end it may adopt any reasonable regulations.

191

Finally, the Court acknowledged the wildlife trust doctrine as set
forth by the Supreme Court of Illinois, which had found that:
So far as we are aware, it has never been judicially denied that the
government, under its police powers, may make regulations for the
preservation of game and fish, restricting their taking and
molestation . . . . It is, perhaps, accurate to say that the ownership of
the sovereign authority is in trust for all the people of the state; and
hence, by implication, it is the duty of the legislature to enact such
laws as will best preserve the subject of the trust, and secure its
beneficial use in the future to the people of the state. But, in any
view, the question of individual enjoyment is one of public policy,
192
and not of private right.

Ultimately, the Court reasoned that “[t]he foregoing analysis of
the principles upon which alone rests the . . . power of the state . . .
to control [ ] ownership [in game] for the common benefit, clearly
demonstrates the validity of the statute of the state of Connecticut
193
here in controversy.”
Geer is a good example of how the Supreme Court has applied a
background principle of property law, the wildlife trust doctrine,
equally across states, even though the individual state in question
had not incorporated the specific application of that principle into
its common law. The Court did so with the wildlife trust doctrine
in Geer, with the public trust doctrine in Illinois Central, and with the
police power in Euclid. Given that federal courts do not craft state
common law, inherent sovereign powers like the police power and
public and wildlife trust doctrines are the only powers which may
be so exercised. This interpretation should be an adequate
response to arguments objecting to the application of the public
and wildlife trust doctrines by federal courts in such circumstances.
In summary, in order to uphold environmental regulation based
upon the public and wildlife trust doctrines, federal courts need
not look with exclusivity at the public trust doctrine case law of
individual states. Instead, exercise of the public trust doctrine
should be viewed on the same plane as state exercise of the police
191. Id. at 533 (citing State v. Rodman, 59 N.W. 1098, 1099 (Minn. 1894)).
192. Id. at 533–34 (citing Magner v. People, 97 Ill. 320, 334 (1881)).
193. Id. at 529.
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power, as in Euclid. The public and wildlife trust doctrines can
serve as background principles of state property law, per Lucas,
without the state courts having ever previously incorporated the
regulation of the specific resource in question into the state’s
common law. Had the Supreme Court undertaken this analysis of
its own precedent, as established in Illinois Central and Geer, the
outcome of Lucas might have been quite different—the Court
could have upheld state application of the public and wildlife trust
194
doctrines itself to overcome the takings claim.
D. Checks on Expansive Public and Wildlife Trust Doctrine
Application
Finally, one might argue that allowing broad application of the
public and wildlife trust doctrines, to both the types of resources
which may be protected and the breadth of jurisdictions which may
exert such protections, could destroy important private property
rights. The criticism might be that almost any amenity or resource
could be characterized as a “public interest,” and there would be
no limit on the application of these doctrines. A democratically
elected government might then be allowed to “take” property by
regulation without paying for it. Scholars have addressed this
criticism, stating that:
Indeed, the scope of the public trust doctrine is subject to
considerable debate. Many scholars acknowledge the public trust
doctrine but maintain that the reach of the doctrine should be fixed.
They argue that sudden shifts in the doctrine’s application cannot
inhere in a title because abrupt changes in the doctrine cannot be
consistent with settled rules of state law. Critics of an evolving public
trust doctrine are correct that sudden shifts in a doctrine argue
against its characterization as a background principle. But it is
inconsistent to recognize the public trust doctrine as a background
principle on one hand and then limit its application to a “traditional
scope” on the other. Controlled evolution is inherent in the very
definition of the public trust doctrine; the fundamental purpose of
the doctrine is to meet the public’s changing circumstances and
needs. Just as what constitutes nuisance has changed over time, so
too has the public trust doctrine slowly been “molded and extended”
to satisfy the needs “of the public it was created to benefit.” Careful,
predictable expansions of the doctrine, therefore, are not novel
194. This would be contrary to the Court’s assertion that this was to be decided at the
state level. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
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legislative decrees, but constitute a firmly embedded exercise of state
195
duty.

Indeed, courts already perform a check on application of the
public trust doctrine in the various states. As the above statement
demonstrates, the public and wildlife trust doctrines need not be
treated any differently than nuisance law, especially with regard to
the way each doctrine has evolved. Furthermore, standards of
controlled application are already in place for other background
principles of state power, such as the sovereign and inherent police
power, as no regulation enacted pursuant to that power may be
196
arbitrary or unreasonable.
Likewise, the courts can continue to place bounds on application
of the public and wildlife trust doctrines.
Cases already
demonstrate such bounds, as legislatures have been required to
show that species or resources are numerically valuable, i.e. scarce
197
As such,
or endangered, or otherwise economically valuable.
195. Kanner, supra note 55, at 67 (citing Zachary C. Kleinsasser, The Law and Planning of
Public Open Space: Boston’s Big Dig and Beyond, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 421, 433–34 (2005)
(citation omitted)). Another scholar noted that
[s]ome commentators have argued that an expanded, non-tidal application of the
public trust as a defense to takings claims is inconsistent and irreconcilable with Lucas
because it exceeds common law understandings of the doctrine. But this argument
seems inconsistent with the Lucas Court’s suggestion that background principles may
have the potential to evolve beyond their historical scope.
Blumm, supra note 164, at 343.
196. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1928) (holding that it is the role of the courts to ensure that
the legislature’s use of the police power is not arbitrary).
197. See, e.g., Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1917); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928); State v. Sour Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 78 (App. Div. 2000); Sierra Club v.
Dep’t of Forestry and Fire Protection, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 (Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (ordered
not published); National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). For
example, economic value presumably could include medicinal value of plants which treat a
variety of illnesses. Also, in another parallel to zoning, Justice Stevens’s dissent in Lucas
highlighted that courts have frequently looked to the generality of a regulation to determine
whether or not a taking occurred. Stevens, citing Euclid, stated,
[p]erhaps the most familiar application of this principle of generality arises in zoning
cases. A diminution in value caused by a zoning regulation is far less likely to constitute
a takings if it is part of a general and comprehensive land-use plan . . . conversely ‘spot
zoning’ is far more likely to constitute a taking.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1073 (1992). Stevens continued,
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assertion of the public or wildlife trust doctrines by legislatures
would not reflect the whimsical will of a determined majority, but
instead a genuine, statistically validated attempt by the legislature
to protect an important environmental resource which otherwise
would be lost to the public at large.
IV. CONCLUSION
In order to protect the environment from the harmful acts of
private landowners, it is necessary for the government to maintain
the authority to enact necessary environmental regulations. Such
regulations are sometimes thwarted by private property owners
asserting Fifth Amendment takings claims. It is clear, however, that
the public and wildlife trust doctrines, deeply rooted in American
historical jurisprudence, provide valuable tools to overcome some
of these challenges. These doctrines have been applied in an
evolving fashion by both state legislatures and state courts. A
collection of federal and state cases, guided primarily by the
principles established in Illinois Central and Geer, place not only
submerged lands and coastal zones within the coverage of the
public and wildlife trust doctrines, but also wildlife, plants, habitat,
and other environmental resources of great public concern. If
properly asserted, or even argued at all, these doctrines may have
obviated the need of the South Carolina Supreme Court, on the
Lucas remand, to find that the BMA constituted a taking.
Just as with the police power, a strong argument exists that the
public and wildlife trust doctrines are virtually identical
background principles of property law vested in every state equally
at the time of creation. If any state validly retains the power to
protect a particular valuable resource under the public or wildlife
trust doctrines, any and all states may attempt to regulate in such a
manner, regardless of whether that particular state’s courts

[i]n considering Lucas’s claim, the generality of the Beachfront Management Act is
significant. The Act does not target particular landowners, but rather regulates the use
of the coastline of the entire State. Indeed, South Carolina’s Act is best understood as
part of a national effort to protect the coastline, one initiated by the federal Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1074. Thus, whether or not the public or wildlife trust doctrines are
asserted as part of a general comprehensive scheme might provide an additional parameter
to appropriately limit application of the doctrines in the takings context.
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previously incorporated the subject of regulation into its body of
common law. It is enough that the state legislature makes a valid,
supported assertion that the resource being protected is of great
public importance, and that courts find the statute to be reasonable
and non-arbitrary. This approach is supported by the “inherent
sovereignty” analysis of Illinois Central, as well as the Geer Court’s
reliance on other states’ public trust doctrines when interpreting a
Connecticut statute. Had the Supreme Court considered these
principles in Lucas, perhaps it would have found it unnecessary to
remand the case to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
History demonstrates that the public and wildlife trust doctrines
are valid “background principles of property law” which can
overcome takings claims brought against state environmental
regulations, both at the state and federal level. It will be important
to look to history if today’s environment is to be preserved for
future generations of private property owners.

